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Time, place and empathy: the poetics and phenomenology
of Andrei Tarkovsky’s film image
KRISTEN KREIDER and JAMES O’LEARY
Acclaimed Russian film-maker Andrei Tarkovksy’s specific
understanding of what constitutes the ‘film image’ is
outlined in his collection of writings, Sculpting in Time
(1986), and evidenced by his body of film work. Our aim in
this article is to identify the specificity of Tarkovsky’s theory
and practice of the film image and to argue that the film
image is a meaningful composite of poetic, spatial and
material properties. We unpack this complexity through a
close, careful and attenuated reading of a single scene from
Tarkovsky’s film Nostalghia (1983). In this scene, the film’s
protagonist – the poet, Gorchakov – carries a lit candle
across the expanse of the Santa Catarina pool. The pool, a
geothermal bath in the Tuscan hillside town of Bagno
Vignoni, Italy, is emptied for this shot, but still steaming.
This infuses the film image with atmospheric qualities of
place. We read these qualities in relation to Tarkovsky’s use
of symbol, the relationship of this scene to others in the
context of the filmic narrative, and the filmic syntax of the
long take and tracking shot. We also examine how the film
image is received, as a projection, by an embodied
recipient, and to what effect. Through this discussion, we
defend Tarkovsky’s work against charges that it embodies a
naïve realism, exposing the critical potential inherent in
Tarkovsky’s nostalgic impulse.
Prior to shooting the penultimate scene of Nostalghia
(1983), acclaimed Russian film-maker Andrei Tarkovsky
told the actor Oleg Yankovsky his intention of ‘displaying
an entire human life in one shot, without any editing,
from beginning to end, from birth to the very moment
of death’ (Bird 2008b, 192). Should Yankovsky succeed,
Tarkovksy told him, ‘the act may be the true meaning of
my life. It certainly will be the finest shot I ever made – if
you do it, if you endure to the end’ (Bird 2008b, 192).
Yankovsky endured, so Tarkovsky succeeded in filming
one of the most celebrated long take and tracking shots
in the history of cinema. Lasting nine minutes and four
seconds, the shot depicts the poet protagonist,
Gorchakov, played by Yankovsky, as he attempts to carry
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a lit candle across the expanse of the Santa Catarina pool.
The pool, a natural thermal spring in the Tuscan hillside
village of Bagno Vignoni, is emptied for this shot, but
still steaming, thus infusing the film image with a
vaporous atmosphere through which Gorchakov
appears.
In what follows, we discuss Tarkovsky’s specific
understanding of the film image as outlined in his
collection of writings, Sculpting in Time (1986), and
evidenced in his film work. Our aim is to identify the
specificity of Tarkovsky’s theory and practice of the film
image and to argue that the film image, as a visual image,
is a meaningful composite of poetic, spatial and material
properties. We pursue this discussion through a close
analysis of the scene just described from the film
Nostalghia. This scene with Gorchakov and the candle
literally frames our analytical discussion of the film
image since each section of critical writing relates to a
specific durational unit of the scene, and begins with a
written description of it. Thus oscillating between
descriptive writing and analysis, we read the atmospheric
qualities of this film image in relation to Tarkovsky’s use
of symbol, the placement of this scene within the context
of the filmic narrative, and the filmic syntax of the long
take and tracking shot. We also examine how the film
image is received in cinematic space, and to what effect.
Through this discussion we defend Tarkovsky’s work
against charges that it embodies a naïve realism,
exposing the critical potential inherent in his nostalgic
impulse.
0 min 00 sec
TO OPEN (SYMBOL)
Time is a state: the flame in which there lives the
salamander of the human soul.
Andrei Tarkovsky (1986, 57)
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The scene opens with a close-up of hands. Gorchakov’s
hands: candle in the left, lighter in the right. He sparks the
lighter three times to produce a flame and lights the wick.
(A gust.) Placing the lighter into his right pocket, he then
transfers the candle to his right hand and shields the flame
with his left. Turning his back to the camera, he walks to the
stone wall at one end of the pool’s length. With the camera
panning for a full view of the poet’s body, he turns again –
this time to profile – and takes a step . . . He steps, then
stops and turns again – facing the camera; a single surprise
of white hair. He touches the wall to begin. (To befog.)
How might we begin to interpret the penultimate scene
of Nostalghia? As noted above, Tarkovsky himself
described the scene as depicting an entire human life,
from beginning to end, from birth to death. He was, of
course, speaking metaphorically; however, we can see
how this translates into the film image through the
deployment of the candle carried by Gorchakov. In The
Poetics of Space (1964), philosopher Gaston Bachelard
writes that ‘[t]he flame is an image of life, a living
substance, a poeticizing substance . . . an image of life
which consumes but surprisingly rejuvenates itself’
(Bachelard 1994, 45). Following Bachelard, we are led
first along an axis of association where we see the flame
as a life continually threatened with extinction by the
blustering wind that circles around Gorchakov’s palm
through the course of his journey. It is the poet’s task to
protect the vulnerable flame, to ‘keep the flame alive’
throughout his venture across the pool.
Arguably, such an interpretation induces an emotional
effect. In his essay ‘Space and Image in Andrei
Tarkovsky’s Nostalgia: Notes on a Phenomenology of
Architecture’ (1994), philosopher Juhani Pallasmaa
develops Bachelard’s theme and suggests that the
‘curious sense of empathy felt by the viewer in the scenes
with Gorchakov and the candle becomes understandable
through [this] association of flame and life’ (Pallasmaa
1994, 162). Observing the poet with this vulnerable
flame, and making the association between this flame
and life, we are shifted into an empathic state co-existent
with the image.
While this interpretation seems plausible enough, it is
perhaps too easy – or too quick. For we have only just
begun to examine the scene and already we have arrived
at this symbolic meaning with all of its apparent unity
and consequent emotional effect. Bearing in mind such
swiftness, let us turn to Walter Benjamin’s description of
the ‘measure of time’ for the artistic symbol in his essay
The Origin of German Tragic Drama (1963).
Benjamin’s main concern in this essay is to theorise the
representational trope of allegory, which he does by
specifically locating allegorical manifestation within the
Baroque form of the German trauerspeil. In the course of
this discussion, Benjamin offers insight into the
temporality of the artistic symbol when he traces
allegory’s theoretical roots back to Romantic thinkers
Creuzer and Görres. In their discussion of the Classical
symbol, Creuzer and Görres introduced time into the
field of semiotics and this, according to Benjamin,
allowed for a distinction between symbol and allegory
predicated on the temporality of each. ‘The measure of
time for the experience of the symbol is the mystical
instant in which the symbol assumes the meaning into
its hidden and, if one might way so, wooded interior’,
Benjamin writes (2009, 166).1 This ‘momentary totality’
of the plastic symbol contrasts with the ‘series of
moments’ that characterises Baroque allegorical script
(Benjamin 2009, 165). Whereas the meaning of the
former is ‘self-contained’ and ‘concentrated’ the latter,
Benjamin (2009, 165) argues, is developed through a
‘successively progressing, dramatically mobile, dynamic
representation of ideas which has acquired the very
fluidity of time’. Taking into account what Benjamin
here deems the characteristic temporality of the artistic
symbol it seems apt that we would arrive so quickly at
our interpretation of the symbolic meaning of the flame
carried by Gorchakov. And yet, as Pallasmaa notes in the
aforementioned essay, ‘[t]he many images present in
Nostalgia are not intended to be symbols but rather
emotional miniatures, riddles that vainly seek their own
explanation’ (Pallasmaa 1994, 146). This comment
suggests that, in fact, there is something missing from
our interpretation so far: a further complexity of the
flame that must be taken into account in our
interpretation of it.
Let us change orientation: ‘the flame is an image of
life . . . an image of life which consumes’. In the scene
preceding this one with Gorchakov and the candle, the
character Domenico – a man who held his family
prisoner in fear of el fin del mundo and who solicits
Gorchakov to carry the candle – dies by his own hand.
This harrowing act of self-immolation is the crescendo
to Domenico’s inflammatory speech in the piazza of
Rome’s Capitoline Hill in Rome where he cries out to the
masses for a greater social empathy. There (then) as here
(now), the lighter flicks; there (then), as here (now), the
flame burns. The solitary flame of the poet’s silent
journey thus extends ‘back’ along a line – along the axis –
of contiguity to this hyperbolic act of the madman’s
public display and protest. So the light of Gorchakov’s
flame, Bachelard’s ‘image of life’, becomes weighted with
its reference to the death of Gorchakov’s alter ego.
We can thus appreciate that the emotional effect of the
penultimate scene of Nostalghia is due not only to an
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association between the flame and a (vulnerable) life but
also, by extension, to the sense of mourning we feel in
relation to the flame’s oblique reference to Domenico’s
death.
The movements so far – the poet crossing the pool with
the lit candle; we, following him, shifted along the
vectors of metaphor and metonymy – generate meaning
through the symbolic properties of the flame, as
contextualised within the construct of the filmic
narrative. This sees the flame emerge into the sign of a
vulnerable life and, coextensively, a life that is lost. We, in
turn, are moved into the emotional states of empathy
and mourning. The flame thus embodies, in Pallasmaa’s
terms, an ‘emotional miniature’. But what of Pallasmaa’s
further designation of Tarkovsky’s images as ‘riddles’.
Q: What is the flame in which there lives the salamander of
the human soul?
To answer this riddle we must move from a discussion of
symbol toward one of image: a shift from the flame to
the frame and, with it, the contradictions inherent in
Tarkovsky’s theory and practice of the film image.
Outlined in Sculpting in Time, and evidenced in his film
work, Tarkovsky’s writing on and construction of the
film image will serve to complicate our initial
interpretation of this scene with Gorchakov and the
flame.
0 min 35 sec
TO BEGIN (IMAGE)
An image is not a certain meaning . . . but the
entire world reflected as in a drop of water.
Andrei Tarkovsky (2004, 12)
Why this touch to begin? This point of contact before the
venture? Because hand touching stone is ground and
grounding. A proximity prior to movement and spacing,
without which there is no distance – (interval) – without
which there is no meaning . . . ‘the act may be the true
meaning of my life’ (Bird 2008b, 192) . . . So this first
touch marks a first separation and the poet’s exile toward
horizon: an entry into meaning coextensive with the
borderless state of nostalgia. Meanwhile the eye – lid
fluttering – is drawn to the flame that, central to the frame,
is screened by the poet’s protective palm.
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In Sculpting in Time (1986), Tarkovsky posits that the
first principle of the cinematic image is observation. He
arrives at this understanding through a more general
discussion of what he terms the ‘artistic image’. The
artistic image is, for Tarkovsky, a means of capturing a
singular and unique moment of existence. The artist’s
aim, he argues, is to make incarnate ‘a precise
observation of life’ by re-presenting it as image (1986,
106). And this, he argues, ‘takes us straight back to
Japanese poetry’ and, specifically, the poetics of Japanese
haiku (1986, 106).
The defining characteristic of Japanese haiku is its
attempt to capture a moment of consciousness through
precise observation: this rather than to impart a message
through the choice and manipulation of the objects
depicted with their reified symbolic value. Formally, the
haiku is characterised by an economic 5-7-5 syllabic
count and the inclusion of a seasonal reference, or kigo
( ). The kigo is significant in that it exhibits a
fundamental relationship to time and place, offering
readers a sense of locatedness in the ritual and cyclical
movements of the world. Conceptually, haiku embodies
the principle of shasei: to copy life objectively or ‘sketch
from life’, thus aligning haiku with Tarkovsky’s
definition above of the artistic image. Tarkovsky
references the following haiku by Basho¯:
The old pond was still
A frog jumped into the water
And a splash was heard.
‘How simply and accurately life is observed’, Tarkovsky
then exclaims. ‘What discipline of mind and nobility of
imagination. The lines are beautiful, because the
moment, plucked out and fixed, is one, and falls into
infinity’ (1986, 107). These lines are full of beauty for
Tarkovsky, and full of meaning: ‘The Japanese poets
knew how to express their visions of reality in three lines
of observation. They did not simply observe it, but with
supernal calm sought its ageless meaning’ (1986, 107).
For Tarkovsky, the haiku beautifully, and meaningfully,
(re)presents one’s vision of reality through the poetic
rendering of a precise observation that ‘plucks out’ and
‘fixes’ a unique and singular moment of existence,
ushering it into being as image.
That Tarkovsky bases his understanding of the film
image on precise, accurate observation modelled on the
Japanese haiku underlies his desire – at least in his
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theoretical writing – to dispel symbolism in the film
image. Drawing specifically from examples in film that
produce this effect, Tarkovsky describes a scene from
Kurosawa’s The Seven Samurai (1954) as follows:
A medieval Japanese village. A fight is going on
between some horsemen, and the samurai who
are on foot. It is pouring with rain, there is mud
everywhere. The samurai wear an ancient
Japanese garment which leaves most of the leg
bare, and their legs are plastered with mud. And
when one samurai falls down dead we see the
rain washing away the mud and his leg
becoming white, as white as marble. A man is
dead; that is an image which is a fact. It is
innocent of symbolism, and that is an image.
(1986, 73)
The image as ‘fact’ is absent of symbolic meaning or, as
Tarkovsky terms it, ‘innocent’ of symbolism. He then
draws an example from the making his own film Andrey
Rublyov (1966) to illustrates how he attempts to cultivate
this innocence in his own work: ‘The script includes an
episode in which a peasant, who has made himself a pair
of wings, climbs up on to the cathedral, jumps, and
crashes to the ground’, he writes (1986, 80). This episode
clearly evidences a man’s desire for flight. However, in
portraying it, Tarkovsky was not interested in depicting
the Icarian overtones of the man’s fall. Instead, he asked
himself how this really would have occurred:
People were running after him, he was
hurrying. Then he jumped. What would this
man have seen and felt as he flew for the first
time? He didn’t have time to see anything, he
fell and was shattered. The most he could have
known was the unexpected, terrifying fact of
falling. The inspiration of the flight, its
symbolism, were [sic] eliminated. (1986, 73)
It is the reality of the situation, not the symbolism
inherent in it, that Tarkovsky was interested in: ‘The
screen had to show an ordinary, dirty peasant, then his
fall, his crash, his death. This is a concrete happening, a
human catastrophe, observed by onlookers’, he writes
(1986, 80). In order to effect this, Tarkovsky describes
how he had to work out a way to ‘destroy the plastic
symbol on which the episode was built’; hence, his
decision to get rid of the wings and, instead, use an air
balloon, ‘a clumsy object put together from skins, ropes
and rags’ (1986, 80). All of this suggests that Tarkovksy
was clearly intentional about the deployment of objects
in themise en scène of his films. However, in choosing
particular objects his intent was not so much to
manipulate as to minimise their symbolic value, thereby
bringing them closer to the image as it manifests in a
form like Japanese haiku.
Without question it is difficult, if not impossible, for any
artistic message – even Japanese haiku – to completely
dispel the symbolic value of objects appearing within it.
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Moreover, Tarkovsky’s desire for an image ‘innocent’ of
symbolism appears at odds with his choice and
manipulation of objects laden with symbolic, and
particularly Christian, meaning, in many of his films.
There is a contradiction, then, between Tarkovsky’s
theory of the film image, predicated on haiku and an
absence of symbolism, and his practice as a film-maker,
producing films rife with symbolic meaning. In what
follows, we look at how Tarkovsky’s theory and practice
of the film image is riddled with even further
contradictions that, allowed to stand, serve to amplify
the complex meaning of his filmic message.
1 min 17 sec
TO FAIL (TIME)
The image becomes authentically cinematic
when . . . not only does it live within time, but
time also lives within it, even within each
separate frame.
Andrei Tarkovsky (1986, 68)
(Rush.) The candle goes out for the first time. The poet
turns, facing the camera, and puts his left hand into his
pocket. He walks back to the wall at the far end of the pool,
his steps retracing the path from whence they came, and we
follow. This time, without a focus on the flame, the scene
before us flattens: stone inner wall and outer boundary;
moss-mottled floor; the poet in his brown coat – a figure
enmeshed in ground.
We have seen that, for Tarkovsky, the first principle of the
cinematic is observation. This, in turn, implies a
fundamental relationship between the film image and
perception: ‘[t]he image in cinema is based on the ability
to present as an observation one’s own perception of an
object’, Tarkovsky writes (1986, 107). Tarkovsky’s
emphasis here on the act of perceiving and, in turn, the
presentation of this act underlies an ontology of the film
image: ‘[t]he cinema image comes into being during the
shooting, and exists within the frame’, Tarkovsky posits
(1986, 114). In other words, there is no film image before
the film shoot, in the film-maker’s idea of what it might
be; nor is the film image constructed afterwards, on the
editing table. Instead, the emergence of the film image is
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coextensive with the act of perceiving/recording, thereby
framing, an act of perception that is later presented to
the viewer. Moreover, and most crucially, the fact that
any act of perception implies a duration suggests the
inextricable link between Tarkovksy’s conception of the
film image and time: time, he argues, is literally
‘imprinted in the frame’ during the film shoot. This
brings us to the primary characteristic of the film image
for Tarkovsky: ‘Time, imprinted in its factual forms and
manifestations: such is the supreme idea of cinema as an
art’, he writes (1986, 63). We can now appreciate that
what distinguishes the film image from other art; forms
is its particular relationship to time recorded ‘as fact’.
If Benjamin claims that the temporality inherent in the
(plastic) artistic symbol is that of the momentary and the
instant, we can see how such a temporality is clearly at
odds with Tarkovsky’s conception of the film image as an
‘imprint of time’. Interestingly, such disparity would
therefore appear to align Tarkovsky’s film image with the
allegorical mode of representation that is theorised by
Benjamin in contradistinction to the artistic symbol:
just as allegory is characterised by the ‘very fluidity of
time’, so ‘sculpting in time’ is, Tarkovsky argues,
at the heart of the cinematic art. Now, remember our
riddle?
Q: What is the flame in which there lives the salamander of
the human soul?
The answer to this riddle (as much as the question) lies
in the following quote from Tarkovsky: ‘Time is a state:
the flame in which there lives the salamander of the
human soul’ (1986, 57). And we can begin to unpack this
enigmatic quote in light of our discussion of time and
the film image, alongside this comparison between the
film image and allegory.
In the field of allegory, Benjamin argues, the image is a
fragment.2 Moreover, he claims, ‘[i]t is not possible to
conceive of a starker opposite to the artistic symbol, the
plastic symbol, the image of organic totality, than this
amorphous fragment which is seen in the form of
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allegorical script’ (Benjamin 2009, 176). Suggestively,
salamanders are characterised uniquely by their ability to
grow back limbs. The salamander can thus be associated
with the fragmented body; therefore, with the
‘amorphous fragment’ of the allegorical image. However,
in Tarkovsky’s quote, it is not just any salamander, but
the salamander of the human soul. We associate the
‘soul’– disembodied, transcendent – with the (Christian)
symbol to suggest that intrinsic to the flame is the
unified symbol within which lies the allegorical
fragment. By analogy, intrinsic to Tarkovsky’s film image
is a symbolic meaning wherein is encased, and unfolds,
allegorical meaning. Reading all of this back into the
flame carried by Gorchakov, within the flame’s symbolic
(momentary, transcendent, unified) meaning as an
image of life lies its allegorical (temporal, material,
fragmentary) meaning that, for Benjamin, is associated
with ruin, time and historical reference. Extrapolating
this even further, the flame is emblematic of a genuine
contradiction at the heart of Tarkovsky’s work: the
tension between his materialist bent and symbolic
striving; between the realism of his image and the poetics
of his imagery.
1 min 57 sec
TO BEGIN, AGAIN (RHYTHM)
The dominant, all-powerful factor of the film
image is rhythm, expressing the course of time
within the frame.
Andrei Tarkovsky (1986, 113)
Back at the wall, the poet moves the candle over to his left
hand and reaches for the lighter with his right. With one
look behind at what lies ahead, he lights the candle to
begin, again, touches the wall for second time and turns –
returns – to cross the pool. And we follow . . .
We have looked at how the specificity of Tarkovsky’s film
image stems from its particular relationship to time, and
we have explored the implications of this in light of the
allegorical as theorised by Benjamin. However, the film
image as an imprint of time is actually characteristic of
the medium of film, generally – itself inseparable from
the photographic record – and so can be said of any film
image. What, then, is unique about Tarkovsky’s theory
and practice of the film image? Moreover, how is such
uniqueness embodied in another contradiction?
Having argued at one point in his writing that what
distinguishes the film image from other art forms is its
particular relationship to time recorded ‘as fact’,
Tarkovsky later writes: ‘Naturalistically recorded facts are
themselves utterly inadequate to the creation of the
cinematic image’ (1986, 107). In yet another
contradiction, Tarkovsky suggests that although film
presents its images as ‘fact’, and this imprint of time in
the image is mechanically reproduced, the film image is
not in any way objective. Indeed, for Tarkovsky, both the
generation of the film image and the editing together of
different shots are highly subjective acts. The key to
understanding this – and, in turn, to unlocking the
uniqueness of Tarkovsky’s film image – is rhythm. ‘The
dominant, all-powerful factor of the film image is
rhythm’, Tarkovsky writes, ‘expressing the course of time
within the frame’ (1986, 113). A later passage allows us
to explicate this statement:
Rhythm in cinema is conveyed by the life of the
object visibly recorded in the frame. Just as
from the quivering of a reed you can tell what
sort of current, what pressure there is in a river,
in the same way we know the movement of time
from the flow of the life-process reproduced in
the shot. (1986, 120)
In this analogy the quivering reed bears a meaningful
relationship to the dynamics of the running river: the
movement of this object indexically signifies the river’s
current and pressure. Similarly, the rhythm of the
cinematic image – conveyed by the ‘life’ of recorded
objects, the ‘flow’ of their life-process in the frame of a
shot – makes us aware of the ‘course’ or movement of
time: the rhythm of a shot is an index of time passing.
The task of the film-maker is to recognise and capture
this indexicality through the film shoot, then gather
together different shots, each with their inherent
temporality or rhythm, in order to express his or her
perception of time. Drawing from his own experience as
a film-maker, Tarkovsky writes:
During shooting . . . I concentrate on the course
of time in the frame, in order to reproduce it
and record it. Editing brings together shots
which are already filled with time, and
organizes the unified, living structure inherent
in the film; and the time that pulsates through
the blood vessels of the film, making it alive, is
of varying rhythmic pressure. (1986, 114)
This, in turn, becomes the sign – even signature – of the
film-maker. Tarkovsky again:
In so far as sense of time is germane to the
director’s innate perception of life, and editing
is dictated by the rhythmic pressures in the
segments of film, his handwriting is to be seen
in his editing . . . You will always recognize the
editing of Bergman, Bresson, Kurosawa or
Antonioni . . . because each one’s perception of
time, as expressed in the rhythm of his films, is
always the same. (1986, 121)
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Drawing all of this together, we can now appreciate that,
for Tarkovsky, the film-image presents as an observation
the film-maker’s perception of an object, and the resulting
rhythm – that is, movement of the object within the
frame – expresses his/her perception of time. This
understanding of rhythm is key to appreciating the
uniqueness of Tarkovsky’s theory and practice of the film
image, and also suggestive of an even further
contradiction inherent in his work.
We looked at how Tarkovsky predicates his conception of
the film image on Japanese haiku; however, this
discussion of the rhythm of the film image is actually
counter to the formal tenets of haiku. This is because, for
Tarkovsky, the rhythm of the film image is subjective:
expressing the perception of an object, it is unique to
each film-maker – indeed, Tarkovsky goes so far as to
compare it with a signature. In contrast, the haiku, with
its constant 5-7-5 syllabic count, cannot be deemed
subjective or expressive in the same way.3 Interestingly,
this discussion of rhythm aligns Tarkovsky’s film image
more with Western poetic lyricism – particularly certain
conventions of free verse lyric in which rhythmic
patterns and lineation are associated with a certain
expressiveness of subjectivity and voice – than with
haiku. Such an alignment seems all the more convincing
given that Western lyric is also concerned with plucking
out or capturing a moment of perception, thereby
articulating a state of heightened consciousness. And yet,
where the lyric is a particularly subjective poetic form,
often employing strategies of figuration in order to
generate the meaning of its message, Tarkovsky claims to
diminish such effects; hence, his turn to haiku. Such
diminishment is, as we argued above, more in theory
than in practice. This contradiction is further suggested
by the quote in which Tarkovsky extols the virtue of such
poetic modes of semiotic operation: ‘I find poetic links,
the logic of poetry in cinema, extraordinarily pleasing.
They seem to me perfectly appropriate to the potential of
cinema as the most truthful and poetic of art forms’
(1986, 18). Ultimately, to posit that Tarkovsky’s work
embodies aspects of poetic lyricism is accurate, even if it
suggests a contradiction, insofar as there is a marked
difference between the rhythmic constraint, precise
observation and objectivity of the haiku, upon which
Tarkovksy bases his theory of the film image, and the
expressive rhythmic ‘freedom’, figuration and
subjectivity of the lyric. Nevertheless, the contradiction
offers further insight into Tarkovsky’s cinema. He writes:
Artists are divided into those who create their
own inner world, and those who recreate
reality. I undoubtedly belong to the first – but
that actually alters nothing: my inner world
may be of interest to some, others will be left
cold or even irritated by it; the point is that the
inner world created by cinematic means always
has to be taken as reality, as it were objectively
established in the immediacy of the recorded
moment. (1986, 118)
Logical contradiction thus becomes poetic complexity as
Tarkovsky’s film image uniquely conflates the precise
observation characteristic of haiku and the imaginative,
subjective expression that characterises lyric. In turn, we
can begin to identify Tarkovsky as a realist, but of a
particular ilk: one who depicts an ‘inner world’ through
his careful observation and recording of the ‘outer
world’.
3 min 41 sec
TO FAIL, AGAIN (PLACE)
The first half of the film will probably be set in
Bagno Vignoni. But not in the real place – in an
invented one . . . I shall have to recreate the
atmosphere of the place in detail.
Andrei Tarkovsky (2004, 102)
(Hush.) All this talk – the candle has gone out again . . .
Where is our poet? There he is – almost across the length of
the pool with the candle. Blasted air. Now he must turn
back, again. Another verse. He looks tired now, and wipes
his brow. Stumbles once, but catches himself. (Push.) Once
more the candle transferred to the left hand; right hand in
his pocket to retrieve the lighter.
Tarkovsky’s theory of the film-image is evident in – but
also extended by – his own practice as a film-maker, and
particularly his signature style of the long-take and
tracking shot. One can see quite clearly how the long
take allows for the presentation, as an observation, of the
film-maker’s perception of an object. Throughout the
take the object is held in focus by the camera’s eye: the
object is perceived by the camera – thus, implicitly, by
the film-maker – over the course of a given instance. All
the while, the camera records subtle movements and
changes on film, thus generating the rhythm in the frame
as an expression of his/her perception of time. Now,
couple this long take with the tracking shot: that slow,
mechanical movement of the camera as it scans its visual
horizon. If the long take records the movement(s) of an
object in the frame as an ‘imprint of time’ the tracking
shot implies the movement of the apparatus beyond the
frame. In doing so, it extends Tarkovsky’s theory of the
film-image from its relationship with time to a
relationship with place. How is this so?
In his writing and thinking, Merleau-Ponty takes up the
philosophical project of phenomenology in its rejection
of strict scientific empiricism, on the one hand, and
10 K. Kreider and J. O’Leary
Cartesian rationalism, on the other, to seek instead a
radical way of ‘doing’ philosophy based upon a return to
the life-world and our subjective experience of it prior to
any such objectifications and idealisations. Thus in
keeping with phenomenology’s slogan of ‘returning to
the things themselves’, Merleau-Ponty aims to reawaken
our immediate contact with the world, encouraging us to
‘relearn’ how we look at this world through returning to
a ‘pre-reflective’ or ‘pre-predicative’ situation in which
the unique corporeal perceptions of our ‘lived body’ are
intrinsic to understanding – even primary to it.4 He
writes:
In so far as I have a body through which I act in
the world, space and time are not, for me, a
collection of adjacent points nor are they a
limitless number of relations synthesized by my
consciousness, and into which it draws my
body. I am not in space and time, nor do I
conceive space and time; I belong to them, my
body combines with them and includes them
. . . Our bodily experience of movement is not a
particular case of knowledge; it provides us with
a way of access to the world and the object, with
a ‘praktognosia’ which has to be recognized as
original and perhaps as primary. (1962, 140)
Merleau-Ponty thus suggests that through the actions of
the living-moving body we are i[n contact with the
world, inhabiting space and time. In this respect,
actualising our corporeal intentionality through
movement allows us to experience and perceive our
surroundings, thus giving us intimate access to the
knowable world-as-object.
We can conceptualise this emergent understanding of the
world through embodied perception and movement in
terms of a coming-into-being of place by drawing from
Edward Casey’s reading of Merleau-Ponty in The Fate of
Place (1997), a narrative account of place throughout
the history and development of Western philosophical
thought. Here Casey uses phenomenology,
Merleau-Ponty, to re-conceptualise place, in his
terms, ‘by way of the body’. Casey begins with a
discussion of how the lived body in Merleau-Ponty’s
thought challenges conventional quantitative
conceptions of space (i.e. space as a collection of
points, a conglomeration of sheer relations or a
matter of containment) with a more active
understanding of ‘spatialising’ and ‘spatialised’
space:
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For Merleau-Ponty, the lived body is the origin
of ‘spatialising’ as well as ‘spatialised’ space . . .
The lived body does the spatializing that
eventuates via various formal operations in the
spatialized world of geometry (and physics). Its
empowering force, most completely manifested
in bodily movement, is what lends to space a
‘universal power’ to connect things that would
otherwise be consigned to isolated positions in
the indifferent vacua of homogenous space.
Galileo’s apothegm ‘It moves!’ . . . is
superseded by Merleau-Ponty’s operative
dictum ‘I move’ (1997, 230)
Through the living-moving body of Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenology, argues Casey, space becomes subjective:
both expressive and orientated. ‘Just as the body
continually exhibits “expressive movement” . . . so the
space in which it moves becomes an expressive space,
having its own physiognomy and moods, its affectivity
and style’, Casey writes (1997, 230). ‘Likewise, the same
mobile body is continually orienting us in the particular
space in which we find ourselves’ (1997, 230).
Combining expressive movement and bodily
orientation – and here let us recall the movement of
objects in Tarkovsky’s film image ‘expressing’ a
perception of time; the tracking shot orienting
movements of the filmic eye – this corporeal inhabitation
of space ultimately has implications for re-thinking place
in terms of what Casey calls ‘lived place’.
Lived place, Casey argues, is not an abstract co-ordinate
location but, rather, imbued with material qualities and
scale as experienced uniquely by the lived body that
inhabits it. Moreover, and further in keeping with
Casey’s reading of Merleau-Ponty, it is not just a
phenomenally-stationary, unmoving body that
experiences place, but the living-moving body: the body
that spatialises and therefore not only actualises, but also
makes possible places. ‘A place is somewhere Imight
come to; and when I do come to it, it is not just a matter
of fitting into it. I come into a place as providing an
indefinite horizon of my possible action’, writes Casey
(1997, 232). In this sense, through the spatialising
actions of the living-moving body, lived place has not
only an actual dimension whose material quality, scale
and temporality are perceived and experienced by the
lived body, but also a possible or virtual – one might
even say temporal – dimension made possible by the
perceptions and movements of the lived body.
Let us now relate all of this discussion back to
Tarkovsky’s cinematic practice of the long take and
tracking shot. The long take, as we have suggested,
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records the act of perceiving, which we can now
appreciate as a primary act that awakens our contact
with the world and leads to an intimate, corporeal and
subjective understanding of it. Meanwhile, the tracking
shot orients that perception beyond the edges of the
frame. This movement beyond the frame – that is,
beyond the visual extent of the image – journeys from
the perceived into the yet-to-be-perceived; thus, from the
known into the unknown, made knowable through the
sustained perception held throughout the shot. Taken
together, the long take and tracking shot suggest the
actions through which the living-moving body inhabits a
location in space and time – perceiving the location’s
material qualities, scale and temporality (the long take)
while moving (the tracking shot) – thereby actualising
and making possible lived place.
It is important to note that lived place as it is actualised
by Tarkovsky’s long take and tracking shot is not to be
confused with ‘real place’. This is evident in the
following comment made by Tarkovsky as quoted in
Tarkovsky and Chiaramonte (2004) in relation to the
film location for Nostalghia:
The first half of the film will probably be set in
Bagno Vignon. But not the real place – in an
invented one. Where there is only the pool, and
everything is dilapidated, more intimate, more
provincial. From the very beginning, everything
will take place near the pool by the hotel.
Therefore I shall have to recreate the
atmosphere of the place in detail. (2004, 102)
As this quote suggests, Tarkovsky’s films do not offer a
direct presentation or documentation of objective reality.
Rather, they are representational, imaginative spaces that
are designed and constructed, be it through the careful
framing of a shot, the composition of themise en scène or
the cultivation of a filmic ‘atmosphere’ through, for
example, including elements such as fire, water and
steam. (Or, as Tarkovsky famously did for the film
Sacrifice (1986), painting the grass green to get the
appropriate colour on film.) This nuances our
appreciation of Tarkovsky as a realist, but of a particular
ilk: we now appreciate him as one who carefully
constructs the reality of an ‘outer’ world in order to
record it as a means of expressing an ‘inner’ one.
In sum, the film-image is comprised of (a) rhythmic
movements within the frame that record the perception,
and consequent understanding, of the object coupled
with (b) a concurrent movement beyond the edges of the
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frame, shifting into the unknown-made-known through
an ongoing act of perceiving. This coupling preserves the
process of an emergent understanding: the
coming-into-awareness of the knowable world (that is,
the knowable world of Tarkovsky) that, to use Casey’s
(1997) terms, can also be understood as the
coming-into-being of ‘lived place’. All of which would
seem to suggest the futurity of Tarkovsky’s film image.
And yet, as the camera does not dwell, but ventures ever
onward, the emergence of lived place occurs, necessarily,
in the wake of its figurative death. The question arises: is
there, in fact, an inherent nostalgia to Tarkovsky’s film
image?
5 min 28 sec
FINALLY, TO BEGIN (NOSTALGIA)
Cinema lives by its capacity to resurrect the
same event on the screen time after time – by its
very nature it is, so to speak, nostalgic.
Andrei Tarkovsky (1986, 140)
Again Gorchakov lights the candle, and this time carries it
in his left hand. His right hand holds open his brown coat,
shielding the flame in its fold. His hair wisps. But isn’t all
of this sounding familiar? Like we’ve heard it all before? Is
there anything else that the image says? But perhaps better
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to ask, how else is this image saying and, in turn, what are
the poetical, ethical and political implications of this
address?
One way of arriving at this understanding of the
relationship between Tarkovsky’s film image and
nostalgia is by turning to one of the major criticisms
waged against Tarkovsky. Frederic Jameson argues that
Tarkovksy’s cinema evidences a naïve belief in the
objectivity of the cinematic image. ‘The deepest
contradiction in Tarkovsky’, argues Jameson, is ‘that
offered by a valorisation of nature without human
technology achieved by the highest technology of the
photographic apparatus itself. No reflexivity
acknowledges this second hidden presence, thus
threatening to transform Tarkovskian nature-mysticism
into the sheerest ideology’ (1992, 100). Jameson’s
critique sees Tarkovsky’s cinema as an art form at the
height of modernity and the age of mechanical
reproduction that nonetheless yearns for an unmediated
relation to the world or to nature. Stemming from this
critique, one might see Tarkovsky’s conception of the
film image as an attempt to capture and restore a
moment of time past in which nature is experienced
directly, which is then presented to a viewer. One might
therefore describe Tarkovsky’s cinema as inherently
nostalgic, in the sense that Svetlana Boym refers to as
‘restorative nostalgia’: ‘Restoration (from re-staure –
re-establish) signifies a return to the original stasis, to the
prelapsarian moment’ (2007, 15). Restorative nostalgia
attempts to re-construct or re-build the (mythical)
place, or time, that has been lost – and that one mourns.
In this light, the film image as an ‘imprint of time’
appears fundamentally conservative. However, a
counter-argument to Jameson’s critique will allow
us to nuance this understanding, offering an
alternate reflection on Tarkovsky’s nostalgic
impulse.
In the essay ‘Andrei Tarkovsky and Contemporary Art:
Medium and Mediation’ (2008), Tarkovsky scholar
Robert Bird directly refutes Jameson’s strict
interpretation of Tarkovsky as a naïve realist by placing
an emphasis on the projection of Tarkovsky’s imprinted
image. ‘If he sought to recoup the real’, argues Bird, ‘it
was as a function of the projected image, as it is
imprinted within the apparatus’ (Bird 2008a, 4). In this
sense it is not so much a dream of escaping to a reality
beyond the apparatus that is at stake in Tarkovsky’s
cinema, but an appreciation of the immediacy and
‘reality’ of the projected image itself or, as Bird phrases it,
‘a recognition that the closest thing to immediacy is
when mediation itself becomes the object of
representation’ (Bird 2008a, 11). Tarkovsky, himself,
indicates this when he writes:
Let us say that I want to have time flowing
through the frame with dignity, independently,
so that no-one in the audience will feel that his
perception is being coerced, so that he may, as it
were, allow himself to be taken prisoner
voluntarily by the artist, as he starts to recognise
the material of the film as his own, assimilating
it, drawing it in to himself as new, intimate
experience (1986, 120).
This allows us to appreciate Tarkovsky’s film image –
what Bird labels the ‘imprinted image’ – less in terms of
a restoration of time past than, coupled with its
subsequent projection onto the film screen, an
experience of time passing in the present moment. This,
in turn, is suggestive of a ‘reflective’ nostalgia: Boym’s
counterpoint to the aforementioned restorative
nostalgia. ‘Re-flection means new flexibility, not the
reestablishment of stasis’, writes Boym (2007, 15).
Nostalgia of this sort is not a collective identification of
the ‘truth’ of the past, with an attempt to return to or
restore this ideal; rather, it is a focus on experiential time,
personal memory and the idiosyncratic, non-conclusive,
individual narratives woven from it. Boym again:
Nostalgics of this kind are often, in the words of
Vladimir Nabokov, ‘amateurs of Time, epicures
of duration’, who resist the pressure of external
efficiency and take sensual delight in the texture
of time not measurable by clocks and calendars.
(2007, 15)
Nostalgia understood less as an attempt to recover time
past than as an experience of time’s passing – this, we
suggest, best encapsulates the nostalgic impulse inherent
in Tarkovsky’s theory and practice of the film image.
We can further use Bird and Boym’s arguments,
combined, in order to nuance our understanding of the
nostalgic impulse of the film image as it relates to place.
We looked above at how, during Tarkovsky’s long take
and tracking shot, the camera moves through a given
location: an act of spatialisation that – concomitant with
the passage (and imprint) of time – engenders the
emergence of lived place. We then suggested that this
emergence of lived place as it occurs in the film shoot is
distinct from that which appears in the projected image,
and is then received by a viewer. As a filmic projection,
lived place exists, at least in part, only in memory.
We can now appreciate that this existence is not within a
collective memory as structured by some grand
narrative; rather, it exists within the personal, subjective
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memory of each embodied viewer. This, again, aligns
Tarkovsky’s film image with a reflective, rather than a
restorative, nostalgia.
Bird’s emphasis on projection – that is, on the film image
as mediation – combines with Boym’s argument
concerning reflective nostalgia returns us to our
discussion of how the film image generates meaning, and
the emotional effect this has on the viewer. However, in
order to appreciate this, we must further explore how the
film image, as a projected image, is received.
8 min 47 sec
TO FALL (EMPATHY)
In a world where there is a real threat of a war
capable of annihilating mankind; where social
ills exist on a staggering scale; where human
suffering cries out to heaven – the way must be
found for one person to reach another.
Andrei Tarkovsky (1986, 206)
The poet falls. His heart fails. He, his hands, disappear
from the frame. Still, although the poet has stopped
breathing (his movement from A to B complete, his goal
attained) the flame continues the dance . . .
Vivian Sobchack (1992) highlights the intersubjective
communicative capacities of cinema as a perceptual
experience. Film, as Sobchack explains, represents a prior
direct and reflective perceptual experience on the part of
the film-maker; it then presents this direct and reflective
experience of a perceptual and expressive existence as the
projected film; this is then received and perceived by the
viewer who must interpret it as experience.5 Cinema is
‘based on bodily perception as a vehicle for conscious
expression’, she writes; it entails ‘visible, audible, kinetic
aspects of sensible experience to make sense visibly,
audibly, and haptically’ (Sobchack 1992, 9). Our
reception and perception of the film thus constitutes an
intersubjective perceptual experience, argues Sobchak,
wherein the vision of the film – its ‘address of the eye’ –
solicits me, and ‘I’ respond through an active, intentional
viewing. In this exchange, the film’s vision and my own
do not conflate but, rather, constitute a space of shared
vision that is not only intrasubjectively dialectical, but
also intersubjectively dialogical. There are, Sobchack
argues, two viewing subjects in the cinema ‘sharing a
world’ and ‘constituting an experience’. How does
Sobchack’s argument combine with Bird’s emphasis on
mediation and Boym’s understanding of reflective
nostalgia to suggest how the film image generates
meaning, and to what effect?
When the film image, understood as the record of the
film-maker’s perception of an object, is projected and
offered as an observation for the viewer to perceive and
receive, it functions to halt narrative progression
temporarily: an experience of duration or of time passing
(i.e. a reflective nostalgia) that stops or syncopates time.
This – what might be termed a ‘lyrical compression’, as
rendered through the material poetics of the film
image – in turn opens a contemplative space: slow, but
still active; not escape from, but reflection on the world.
This contemplative space is, as we have seen, an
intersubjective space. And we would now like to suggest
that this intersubjective space is the very framework of
empathic engagement, when understood as an
embodied relational process: a dynamic and complex
construct of perception, imagination, cognition and
affect; a process that allows for a freedom and mobility
between different subject – and even object – positions.
A process that, as such, holds emancipatory and critical
potential insofar as it allows us to move ‘beyond
ourselves’ in order to understand and appreciate
alternative points of view.
Bearing this in mind, might the ‘curious’ sense of
empathy that we feel in relation to the scene with
Gorchakov and the candle, as we alluded to at the start of
this essay, be ascribed less to our symbolic reading of the
flame held by Gorchakov, as per Pallasmaa’s suggestion,
than to our embodied engagement with the screen space
itself? What Bird describes, with specific reference to
Tarkovsky’s work, as a ‘sensate membrane of material
forces, eliciting from the viewer not only intellectual
participation but also physical presence’ (2008a, 8)? In
other words, can we appreciate how the address of the
eye speaks to us through the fire of the flame, the earth of
the stone, evaporated water of the steam as well as that
other element, air. What Luce describes as ‘irreducibly
constitutive of the whole, [that] compels neither the
faculty of perception nor that of knowledge to recognize
it’ (1983, 8). Air. ‘Always there, it allows itself to be
forgotten’, she laments (1983, 8). But have we not been
engaging with the air throughout this poet’s journey?
Virtually, in the memory of the scene of Domenico’s
inflammatory speech. Visually, in the belch of steam, gust
of wind, flicker of flame all framed by the long take and
tracking shot. Perceptually, in the mediation – presumed
transparent, but exposed as, in fact, reflective through its
re-mediation by the lamplight of the projected image.
Also between us, the material space we share and breathe
and through which voice travels to tympanum, across
ossicles, toward the oval window of another’s inner ear
where we make our appearance, both body and story.
In a shared space such as this – a complex construct of
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imagination, cognition, perception and affect – the air is
not forgotten, being always felt.
9 min 04 sec
End.
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NOTES
[1] A discussion of narration and focalisation within the
visual arts would certainly counter this association
between the plastic artistic symbol and a temporality of
the ‘momentary’; however, such a discussion is beyond the
scope of this present article.
[2] Benjamin continues: ‘In the field of allegorical intuition
the image is a fragment. Its beauty as a symbol evaporates
when the light of divine learning falls upon it. The false
appearance of totality is extinguished . . . The dry rebuses
which remain contain an insight, which is still available to
the confused investigator’ (1963, 176).
[3] This is not to say that one cannot find personal inferences
or emotional expression in haiku, but simply to
distinguish the expressiveness of haiku from that of
Tarkovsky’s film image.
[4] Merleau-Ponty says this in his preface to The
Phenomenology of Perception: ‘To return to things
themselves is to return to that world which precedes
knowledge, of which knowledge always speaks, and in
relation to which every scientific schematisation is an
abstract and derivative sign-language, as is geography in
relation to the countryside in which we have learnt
beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a river is’ (1962, ix).
[5] Sobchack notes the term film-maker is used throughout
her own argument not to name a biographical person, his
or her style or manner – as is the case in Tarkovsky’s
argumentation which stems from his much more
authorial bent. Rather, she argues, the term refers to ‘the
concrete, situated, and synoptic presence of the many
persons who realized the film as concretely visible for
vision’ (Sobchack 1992, 9).
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Assistant - Andrew Walker. © Kristen Kreider+ James
O’Leary, 2012.
REFERENCES
Bachelard, Gaston. 1994. The poetics of space [1964] .
Translated by Maria Jolas. Reprint. Boston: Beacon
Press.
Benjamin, Walter. 2009. The origin of German tragic drama
[1963]. Translated by John Osborne. London:
Verso.
Bird, Robert. 2008a. Andrei Tarkovsky and contemporary art:
Medium and mediation. Tate Papers 10: 1–16; available
from http://www.tate.org.uk/research/tateresearch/
tatepapers/08autumn/robert-bird.shtm.
—. 2008b. Elements of cinema. London: Reaktion Books.
Boym, Svetlana. 2007. Nostalgia and its discontents. The
Hedgehog Review (Summer): 7–18; available from http://
www.iasc-culture.org/eNews/2007_10/9.2CBoym.pdf.
Casey, Edward. 1997. The fate of place: A philosophical history.
Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Irigaray, Luce. 1983. The forgetting of air in Martin Heidegger.
Translated by Mary Beth Mader. London: Athlone
Press.
Jameson, Frederic. 1992. The geopolitical aesthetic: Cinema and
space in the world system. Indianapolis: Indiana University
Press.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1962. Phenomenology of perception.
Translated by Colin Smith. London: Routledge.
Pallasmaa, Juhani. 1994. Space and image in Andrei
Tarkovsky’s ‘Nostalgia’: Notes on a phenomenology of
architecture in cinema. In Chora: Intervals in the
philosophy of architecture, edited by Alberto Perez-Gomez
and Stephen Parcell. Montreal: McGill-Queens University
Press, 143–66.
Sobchack, Vivian. 1992. The address of the eye: A
phenomenology of film experience. New Jersey: Princeton
University Press.
Tarkovsky, Andrei. 1986. Sculpting in time: Reflections on the
cinema. Translated by Kitty Hunter-Blair. Austin:
University of Texas Press.
Tarkovsky, Andrei and Giovanni Chiaramonte, eds. 2004.
Instant light: Tarkovsky polaroids. London: Thames and
Hudson.
